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DRAFT/SAVA/[redacted]jes(1 Apr 68)

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1. Thank you for your concern about the situation in Vietnam. My staff has carefully considered your plan and have informed me that the United States Air Force has been conducting operations of the sort you recommend for some time.

2. Obsolescent aircraft (C-47 or DC-3) have been modified to mount machineguns capable of enormous rates of fire. These aircraft regularly patrol certain areas, or are called upon to fire at targets where the enemy has been discovered. The aircraft are capable of firing 18,000 rounds of ammunition each minute. As in any such system, the weight of ammunition necessary to support such great firepower is the limiting factor, and the aircraft currently in use can fire for only fifteen minutes before they must return to the airfield to reload.


3. Since this proposal properly belongs in United States Air Force channels, I shall forward it to them, however, I must in all honesty inform you that the idea is not new and has already been implemented.

Yours very truly,

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

, March 20, 1968 STAT

The Hon.  
Richard Helms, Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington - D.C.  
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Dear Sir:

Please don't take this letter as an audacity or an irreverence.

I've thought that something can be done in order to improve the situation in Viet Nam, to save American lives and to achieve a favorable position for obtaining a convenient peace.

I think that it's possible to use the American air-power effectively against the V.C. and the N.V.A., creating a new kind of weapon, or a new way of using warplanes and weapons the U.S. already have.

But, as I don't have any knowledge about wars, planes or weapons, I'm afraid that my plan won't work. Nevertheless, I feel that, as a citizen of the free world, it's my duty to submit my idea to the authorities who do have that knowledge, and can judge the practicability and usefulness of that idea.

This is why I dare to enclose a short explanation of my plan.


I hope that thru my approach to this problem, some qualified person or committee will find a way to save allied lives and to achieve a victory or, at least, a satisfactory peace in Viet Nam.

If only the life of one American boy or one South Vietnamese could be saved as a consequence of this letter, I should feel fully rewarded.

Yours very truly.

STAT

My address:



AN EFFECTIVE WEAPON

AGAINST THE VIET CONG AND THE NORTH VIET NAM ARMY.

In spite of the clear superiority of the American forces, the red troops in Viet Nam, using guerrilla tactics, are able to evade the allied surveillance, to move from one position to another, and to attack where and when they want. So, the U.S. Marines and the A.R. V.N. Rangers are obliged to stand on the defensive; and this tactic is no the best to achieve a conclusive victory over the enemy.

A major element in U.S. strenght is the undeniable superiority of its airpower. But, with the current tactics, this airpower is ineffective in the face of the guerrillas and the infiltration of men and supplies into the South.

Were the U.S. air forces able to stop the infiltration of men and matériel, a lot of U.S. Marines' and A.R. V.N. Rangers' lives could be saved. And were the action of the aircrafts able to be combined with the other forces so as to assume the offensive, the possibilities of a total victory over the enemy, or, at least, of a satisfactory and honorable peace, should be a lot greater.

I think that it's possible to take advantage of the U.S. airpower in order to fight successfully against the red troops, even against the guerrillas; to stop the infiltration, and to reconquer all the lost land.

The strenght of the N.V.A. lies on the guerrillas; it's necessary to fight them with the weapons the reds can't oppose to: the air power. But we can't attack this intangible force with bombs, missiles or rockets. We must use some new means able to harm, to undermine, to stop the enemy's troops, even if they are hidden in the jungle or in rice paddies, or in trenches, ditches or foxholes; or concealed under the foliage or by the fog; capable to hit the enemy even during the night, or with rain or storms; and this action should be taken so as to prevent unnecessary losses in allied lives or matériel.

My idea is quite simple; may be it's too simple to be good. But I'd like not to have this idea rejected before being carefully analyzed. May be it won't work in the way I suggest; but, by analogy, or by contrast, a qualified mind may find in it the solution we all are seeking so eagerly. It's as follows:

- 1) To select big or medium-seized aircrafts, able to carry heavy loads at high altitudes, with a long range, and having a good navigational equipment. No high speed will be necessary.
- 2) To supply these warplanes with equipment able to shoot a huge amount of common bullets, downward. These bullets should be the smallest ones capable to cause harm or damage to the V.C.F., or to their trucks, deposits or animals, from the hight they are supposed to be shot. The equipment could consist of batteries of automatic machine-guns aimed downward, which direction and angle of shooting could be fixed by the gunner.
- 3) To patrol constantly or by consecutive rounds, by day or by night, with any kind of weather, over the zones where the enemy's troops are suspected to be settled or hidden, or over the roads, trails or paths that are suspectedly used for their infiltration or for sending reinforcements of men or matériel; and to throw as much amount of drumfire as possible over those zones.

No pointing will be necessary; only to cover the selected zones, using the navigational equipment, with a "hail" of bullets, as concentrated as possible. Planes should fly by consecutive waves, or circling the zone to attack. The altitude and the route of the flights should be selected so as to avoid any danger from the ground fire; combining hight of flights with direction and angle of shootings, the warplanes could cover the enemy's zones without major

danger. Fight planes should protect the formations of the machine-gunned planes from attacks by air.

Using all the carrying capability for machine-gun bullets instead of bombs or missiles, a squadron of such planes could throw millions of bullets in a certain area during each mission; assuming that only a very small percentage of bullets could cause casualties or any other kind of harm to the enemy, its importance should be very great, nevertheless, because of its action of embarrassment over the red troops. And as the "hail" of bullets should hit the enemy's areas without any sight of planes, because these planes could use a route and a height so as to avoid their detection by the V.C., the bullets should fall without any prevention, at any moment, by day or by night, or thru overcasts; and this unexpected attack from the sky should determine, without any doubt, fear and anguish among the V.C., and undermine their fighting capability and their freedom of movements.

In spite of the low accuracy of this kind of shooting, this weapon could be used in places where the red forces were settled near or around the allied troops. In such a case, schedules of shooting had to be perfectly synchronized with the action of the ground forces; and during the lapse of shooting, previously announced to the allied chiefs, Marines and Rangers should hide under bunkers or any other kind of shields. Schedules of shooting had to be variable and secretly changed, so as to take the red troops by surprise; or could be asked by the chiefs of the ground forces, when an attack or a big movement of the enemy's forces could be foreseen. As the trajectory of bullets will be practically vertical, trenches and foxholes won't be safe, for the red troops, any longer; thus, an important aspect of their tactics should turn useless.

Combining the schedules of shootings with the action of the aviation, the artillery and the infantry, American chiefs could take the offensive and reconquer all the land currently in red hands, zone by zone.

In infested areas, where innocent civilians could suffer the action of the machine-gunned planes, this weapon could still be used, during the curfew hours. Any movement of guerrillas or matériel during the curfew could be stopped with the constant action of the machine-gunned planes. Allied forces should patrol those areas, shielded in armored trucks or carriers.

For this new weapon, planes too old or too slow to be used in bombing missions, could be prepared and successfully used to throw the "hail" of bullets, appropriately protected by fighters. STAT

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TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	[REDACTED]		
2	SAVA		
3			
4			
5			
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
<p>Please examine this and see if it makes any sense. If it does, we should send him an acknowledgment.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 80px; height: 30px; margin-left: 500px;"></div> <p><i>Bud:</i> <i>Pls see me</i></p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
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